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ABSTRACT
MEASURING THE QUALITY OF BANKING REGULATION AND
SUPERVISION
AND ITS RELEVANCE FOR INFLATION IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES
Dinner, Nazire Nergiz 
MS., Department of Economics 
Supervisor; AsstT Prof Bilin Neyapti
December 1999
Bank regulation and supervision is essential to maintain confidence and 
stability in the financial system. The contribution of this study is twofold: primarily, 
we develop a technique to measure the quality of bank regulation and supervision by 
identifying the techniques and tools that should exist in a banking law. Secondly, 
using this measurement criteria, we form an index of banking regulation and 
supervision (RS) in a manner that allows systematic comparisons. We then use this 
index to document and quantify the cross-sectional and over time variation in the 
quality of RS in transition economies. This empirical findings support our hypothesis 
that regulation and supervision is negatively associated with inflation; and good 
regulation and supervision along with a high level of legal central bank independence 
and liberalization has a significant effect on price stability. Results not only confirm 
the studies of Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1999) and Melo, Denizer and Gelb 
(1996), but also modifies them by incorporating an additional institutional dimension.
Ill
ÖZET
BANKA DENETİM VE GÖZETİMİNİN ÖLÇÜMÜ 
VE GEÇİŞ EKONÖMİLERİNDE ENFLASYONLA İLİŞKİSİ 
Dinçer, Nazire Nergiz 
Master, Ekonomi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr, Bilin Neyapti
Aralık 1999
Finans sisteminde güveninirliliğin ve stabilitenin sağlanabilmesi için denetim ve 
gözetim mekanizmalarının iyi çalışıyor olması gerekir. Bu çalışmanın literatüre 
katkısı iki yönlüdür: birincil olarak, bankaların denetim ve gözetimini sağlamak 
amacıyla bir banka kanonunda mevcut olması gereken araçları ve tekniklerin 
kalitesini ölçmek üzere bir kriter listesi olüşturulmuştur. İkinci olarak ise, bu kriter 
listesi kullanılarak, geçiş ekonomilerinin denetim ve gözetimlerinin sistematik 
karşılaştırılmalarını sağlayacak şekilde kesimler arası (cross-sectiön) ve zaman 
içindeki değişimlerini açıklayacak banka denetim ve gözetim endeksi (RS) 
üretilmiştir. Bu endeks ile ölçülen denetim ve gözetim derecesinin enflasyonla ters 
ilişkili olduğu ve yüksek seviyede merkez bankası bağımsızlığı (hükuksal anlamda) 
ve piyasa liberalizasyonon iyi denetim ve gözetimle birlikte fiyat istikrarında etkin bir 
rol oynadığı hipotezi desteklenmiştir. Bu sonuçlar, Cukierman, Webb ve Neyapti 
(1999) ve Denizer, Melo ve Gelb (1996) makalelerinin bulgularım desteklemekte ve 
geliştirmektedir.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there have been many changes in the banking sector because 
of both globalisation and improvements in technology. These changes increased the 
role of the banking sector in the overall economy. A stable financial system is 
necessary both for a stable economy with low inflation and for a stable growth path. 
Obtaining a stable financial system is possible only with a healthy banking system, 
which can be attained by good regulation and supervision. Then, the question is how 
to achieve an effective banking regulation and supervision.
Regulation is defined as "the public administrative policing of a private 
activity with respect to a rule prescribed in the public interest" (Mitnick, 1980:7). 
The fundamental goal of bank regulation is staled as "to promote the efficient 
allocation of scarce economic resources by minimising disruptions in the payments 
mechanism by which funds are transferred between savers and borrowers" in Barth 
and Brumbaugh (1996). We can restate the idea, as the goal of bank regulation is to 
maintain confidence and stability in the financial system. However, the existence of a 
legal regulatory framework may not reflect the actual practice in a given country. 
The extent to which regulations are put into practice depends on the structure of the 
politics, among many other elements, of the country. Although the existing 
regulatory framework may not tell about the actual performance, it still provides a 
valuable tool to understand the forces behind a given degree of financial stability.
Supervision is an important tool for the health of the financial system. 
However, the power that a regulatory framework assigns to the supervisory 
authorities also affects the performance of the supervision. Thus, supervision may be 
effective with only effective regulation. The principle work of supervisory agencies 
includes the establishment of regulations in accordance with law, and the evaluation 
of ‘safety and soundness’ of the institutions supervised. The objectives of 
supervision are protecting depositors, protecting the insurance funds; protecting the 
payments mechanisms; protecting the money supply; and assuring that banks abide 
by laws that constrain the private use of their resources. The principal tool of the 
supervisory agencies is bank examinations.
This paper has three major purposes. The first is to identify the techniques 
and tools that should exist in a banking law for effective banking regulation and 
supervision. The second is to document and quantify the cross sectional and over 
time variation in the quality of banking regulation and supervision (RS) in a manner 
that allows systematic comparisons of regulation and supervision in transitional 
economies. The study by de Melo, .Denizer and Gelb (1996) reports that inflation is 
lower in transition economies with a higher level of sustained liberalization. The 
recent study by Cukierman, Miller and Neyapti (1999) reports that there is a positive 
relationship between both liberalization and legal central bank independence (CBI) 
and the abatement of inflation. The third purpose of this paper is to examine whether
•'l«·
higher RS is also associated with lower inflation and, hence, to examine the 
contribution o f RS, of liberalization, and that of legal CBI to price stability.
In the related literature, there are many studies about the bank regulation. 
Who the regulator should be is an issue that has been discussed frequently. Dowd 
(1996), Dowd and Lewis (1992) and ‘free-banking school’ discuss that free banking 
would solve the problems, and that there is no need for regulation. On the other hand, 
Caprio and Summers (1996), Goodhart (1987) and Fair (1986) are against the idea of 
laissez-faire banking. There are discussions for deregulation as an alternative to free 
banking. The supporters of deregulation believe that the regulators should control 
risk without their traditional tools to control the banking system. Garten (1991) is 
against this idea and supports the necessity of the traditional rules. The further 
discussions are presented in Chapter 2 of the paper.
Another issue that is discussed in the literature about bank regulation is what 
banking regulation should involve and how the banks should be regulated. However, 
these studies do not involve international principles but they are case studies that 
mainly concern the rules designed for improving the regulation in a particular 
country. Among them are Garten (1991), who deals with the case of United States, 
Williams (1996), who concerns the Caribbean case, and Berka (1997), who studies 
the Slovakia case.
As for supervision, there are many case studies in the literature that define 
banking supervision and the areas that need improvements. Generally, these studies 
are in the form of working papers of various central banks or the supervisory 
agencies. Some of the other studies are Cooper (1984), who studies the case of 
Britain, and Papadimitriou (1996) who studies the case of the United States.
To this point, however, there has been hardly any systematic work on 
measuring the quality of banking regulation and supervision and its relation to 
inflation. The principles for effective banking supervision are defined by Basle 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). However, the BCBS guidelines do not 
involve principles for effective regulation, nor the methods as to how to evaluate the 
quality of regulation and supervision. The current paper suggests an elaborate 
method to evaluate the quality of banking regulation and supervision. To do this, we 
first develop a criteria list to evaluate the quality of banking regulation and 
supervision principles. Using this criteria list, we derive an index of regulation and 
supervision (RS) that we use to compare the effectiveness of banking regulation and 
supervision among transition countries. The index also allows for empirical research 
on the effects on macroeconomic performance of the quality of regulation and 
supervision.
Our cross-sectional data set consists of nineteen transition economies that 
yield twenty-six data points due to double enactment of banking laws in some of 
them since 1989. We regress inflation on the index RS and test the relationship 
between the quality of banking regulation and supervision and inflation. Moreover, 
we modify the analysis performed by Cukierman, Miller and Neyapti (1998) by 
including the index of RS in the estimation of inflation, along with the indices of 
legal central bank independence and liberalization, in transition economies.
The paper is organised as follows. Chapter 2 describes and rationalises the 
techniques and tools that a banking law should take into account for an effective 
bank regulation and supervision. Chapter 3 presents the procedure to quantify these
qualitative aspects of bank regulation and supervision for the transition countries, 
and to form an index based on this quantification. It also evaluates the banking laws 
of transition economies and points out the areas with respect to which these laws are 
weak. Chapter 4 presents a multiple regression analysis where we regress inflation on 
the indices of legal central bank independence, banking regulation and supervision 
and liberalization in transition economies. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes.
CHAPTER 2
MEASURING THE QUALITY OF BANK REGULATION AND
SUPERVISION (RS)
Financial stability of a country, whether developing or developed, requires a 
strong banking system. To have a safe and sound banking system, in turn, effective 
banking regulation and supervision is necessary.
In view of this, we analyse the transition countries’ banking laws to measure 
the quality of banking regulation and supervision. We, thus, develop a list of criteria 
to evaluate the extent of power given by law to bank regulators and supervisors and 
the various restrictions on banks’ activities and management stated in banking laws.
In constructing our evaluation criteria, we pay close regard to the documents 
of 'Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)'. Basle Committee has been 
reported to work in the field of strengthening financial stability throughout the world 
for many years, both directly and through its many contacts with banking supervisors 
in every part of the world. In the last few years, it has been examining how best to 
expand its efforts aimed at strengthening prudential supervision in all countries to 
enhance prudential supervision in its member countries. In particular, the Committee 
has prepared many documents for release. One of them that we use as a guideline, 
the Basle Core Principles (BCP, 1997), comprise twenty-five basic principles that 
need to be in place for a supervisory system to be effective. The principles relate to 
the preconditions for effective banking supervision, licensing and structure.
prudential regulation and supervision, information requirements, formal powers of
supervisors and cross-border banking. In the document it is stated that
The Principles are minimum requirements and in many cases may need to be 
supplemented by other measures designed to address particular conditions 
and risks in the financial systems of individual countries, Basle Core 
Principles are intended to serve as a basic reference for supervisory and other 
public authorities in all countries and internationally.
Although for effective regulation and supervision it is necessary for banking 
laws to involve these principles, these conditions are not sufficiently elaborate, 
especially for banking regulation. For this reason, while constructing our criteria list 
we take as a guideline not only these principles but also many other necessary rules 
for effective regulation and supervision. By analysing both the transition and 
developed countries’ laws and the related literature, we develop a criteria list that 
covers all the elements of regulation and supervision that a banking law should 
address to achieve financial stability.
Another important point about the Core Principles is that they do not involve 
the methods of implementing the banking laws. We, therefore, derive our criteria list 
from the original banking laws and the literature, rather than basing entirely on BCP. 
Nevertheless, we do not claim that this analysis results in a perfect measure of the 
actual quality of banking regulation and supervision, since our measure reflects only 
what is implied by banking laws.
We should, also, mention that the current version of our criteria list, thus our 
study, draws mainly on the banking laws adopted by transition economies, besides 
the guidelines provided by BCP. We may therefore expect modifications to the list o f  
criteria we develop here to evaluate banking laws, as we extend our analysis to
include developed or developing countries. The scope of the current study, however, 
is limited to the transition economies and, hence, a comparative evaluation of their 
banking system is still possible within this scope.
In this chapter, we discuss the rationale behind each criteria of our evaluation 
system, which involves a stratified coding method for each criterion. The criteria list 
is also provided in Appendix A.
Our criteria for measuring the quality of bank regulation and supervision 
concern eight main issues: i. Capital requirements; ii. restrictions on lending; iii. 
ownership structure; iv. directors and managers; v. reporting and recording 
requirements; vi. corrective action; vii. regulatory agency; viii. supervisory agency.
A. Capital Requirements
Capital requirements carry major importance for effective regulation and 
supervision in a banking law. By means of minimum capital requirements and limits 
on using and holding the capital, banks are prevented from having excess risk, which 
could threaten the financial sector's stability and liquidity.
There are, however, ongoing debates in the financial sector about whether 
these limits may cause some disadvantages to both the financial and the real sector of 
the economy. Primarily, the question is whether firmly applied capital standards or 
minimum capital requirements induce, weakly capitalised banks to rebuild their
capital ratios in various ways more rapidly than otherwise. There is, to date, no 
empirical support about this debate, however.
The second question is whether the banks restrict their credits because of the 
capital requirements so that it has a narrowing effect for the real economy or not. 
However, empirical results show that it is not the case. Capital requirements for 
banks appear to limit excessive risk-taking, relative to capital, by reducing the 
likelihood of bank failures. If they are successful in this, the requirements could, 
overall, have a positive effect on output (for further discussions see 'Capital 
Requirements and Bank Behaviour: The impact of the Basle Accord', BCBS 
Working Papers, 1999).
Finally, whether minimum capital requirements lead the banks to loose their 
competitiveness or not can be questioned. Empirical studies, however, have found no 
evidence in that direction.
The evidence shows that banks change the composition of their assets when 
they face a binding regulatory capital constraint, substituting away from high risk- 
weighted assets. Thus, it is necessary to have minimum capital requirements for good 
regulation and supervision. What kind of capital requirements are necessary for good 
regulation and supervision, however, is the question arising. The criteria regarding 
minimum capital requirements are summarised in three parts: Minimum capital at 
licensing; capital adequacy; and major acquisitions and investment.
In the licensing stage of the bank, the minimum capital is necessary for the 
bank to support its strategic plan, especially in light of start-up costs and possible 
operational losses, as the Basle Core Principles state. In our view, a legal statement 
of the nominal minimum amount for licensing would reflect good regulation. 
Evaluation of banking laws reveal, however, that the minimum capital required is to 
be determined by the supervisor, and usually not stated in the law. We conjecture 
that, the lack of definite statement about minimum capital requirements reflects loose 
regulation as it allows the practice to change day by day and thus possibly would 
allow for an unequal treatment of the banks, especially when coupled with the 
influence of the political games and rent-seeking activity.
1. Minimum Capital at Licensing:
2. Capital Adequacy
In the absence of any legal limitations, banks may take excess risk to increase 
their profitability. To maintain the liquidity and the safety of the banks, there are 
usually legal provisions regarding banks’ asset compositions. This leads banks to 
diversify their asset portfolio by reducing their concentration on risky assets. For this 
reason, authorities suggest that the total amount of risky substandard assets and non­
performing assets of a bank should not exceed 5 percent of its liable capital.
Another important criterion of good banking regulation is the clear definition 
of liable capital. If the type of assets and capital that make up liable capital is not
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clearly identified, the limits on the banks’ asset composition would not be effectively 
adhered to, since those limits are often defined as the percentage of the liable capital. 
Hence, a prudent account of liable capital is necessary for good regulation.
Banks may also need to hold extra reserves for the cases of illiquidity that 
may either arise from internal problems or from macroeconomic problems. Since in 
such emergencv situations it would be hard to obtain interbank liquidity or 
supervisory support in financial terms, holding extra reserves is necessary for 
maintaining the liquidity of a bank, and the soundness of the banking system by 
allowing the payment of liabilities on time.
3. Major Acquisitions and investments
Once a bank has been licensed, it may conduct any activity that is normally 
permissible for banks or any range of activities specified in the banking licence. 
Nevertheless, limitations on acquisitions and investments help to prevent both banks 
and the financial sector from taking excess-risks. Such limitations may take various 
forms.
Firstly, there can be limits on the aggregate amount of investment. When the 
investment of the bank exceeds that specified level, liquidity problems may arise. 
When an institution needs money in cases of emergency, its investment 
commitments may obstruct it, if enough cash can not be made available within the 
needed period. A second type of problem could be in regards to the lending capacity
11
of the bank, which is the main activity of a bank. When banks earn enough money 
from their investments, there will be no need to give credits, which would have a 
narrowing effect for the economy. However, investment without limit would damage 
the safety of the bank and the financial sector, as investment would be risky and may 
cause high losses.
A third type of limitation on investment may be on the amount invested on 
juridical people. When a bank invests in another financial institution and if its share 
is more than a specified level, this may lead to a monopoly, which can be dangerous 
for the entire financial sector. Another reason why we consider the limit for the 
aggregate amount of investment on juridical persons is to limit the risk factor. To 
reduce the likelihood of monopoly, we suggest that the composition of investment 
should be diversified. Otherwise, when a crisis hits the sector, in which a bank has 
concentrated its investments, the loss of the bank would be very large.
As the percentage of aggregate amount of investment increases, the bank 
would have more power to influence the activities of greater number of banks. This 
would, in turn, increase the likelihood of monopoly.
In case of default, a bank may hold the capital of another juridical person for 
three years or more. In fact, it can be argued that a time-limitation on holding capital 
is not necessary, as the case does not have the risk of monopoly.
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1. Lending to the Private Sector:
Extending loans is the primary activity of most banks. Notwithstanding the
many different reasons due to which financial sector may face difficulties, BCBS
{Principles for the Management of Credit Risk, 1999:9) states that:
The major cause of serious banking problems continues to be directly related 
to lax credit standards for borrowers and counterparts; poor portfolio risk 
management; or a lack of attention to changes in economic or other 
circumstances that can lead to deterioration in the credit standing of bank's 
counterparts. Thus to overcome lending-related problems bank laws should 
draw lessons from the past experiences. Effective regulation and supervision, 
thus, require the identification, measurement and monitoring the credit risk.
When a bank faces the decision to give emergency loan, it usually has no 
means to definitively determine the risk/profitability ratio. It is the supervisor who 
then has a chance to influence such loan decisions.
Granting credit involves accepting risk as well as producing profits. Banks 
assess the risk/return relationship of any credit decision. To assess the true risk-return 
relationship, bank needs to get to know the borrower, to decide whether the borrower 
is creditworthy or not. There are many methods that may be used in this process. 
BCBS {Principles for the Management of Credit Risk, 1999:15) include the 
following:
* The bank analyses the financial condition of the borrower;
* why he wants the credit;
* where the borrower will use it;
* the integrity and reputation of the borrower;
* the current risk profile of the borrower and its sensitivity to economic and 
market developments;
* the borrower's repayment history and current capacity to repay, based on
B. Lending
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historical financial trends and cash flow projects,
* a forward-looking analysis of the capacity to repay based on various 
scenarios;
* the legal capacity of the borrower or counterpart to assume the liability;
* for commercial credits, the borrower's business expertise and the status of 
the borrower's economic sector and its position within that sector;
* the proposed terms and conditions of the credit, including covenants 
designed to limit changes in the future risk profile of the borrower; and
* where applicable, the adequacy and enforceability of collateral or 
guarantees, including under various scenarios.
These steps help to know customer better and understand the level of the risk, 
and it is better for banks to follow these before extending credit. In order to ensure 
that these information are true and valid, references from known parties may be 
asked, credit registries may be assessed, managers may be searched. It is hard when a 
bank individually tries to build an effective system for evaluating the 
creditworthiness of the borrower. Instead, a system that involves the supervisor as 
the coordinator and all the banks’ credit portfolios and borrowers’ (with a financial 
history) risk ratings would work well. Such a system would reduce the time to search 
the borrower and decrease the likelihood of stating false information of the borrower.
We hypothesise that when the amount of the loan given to a borrower is a 
significant portion of the bank’s portfolio, then the bank should have a right to 
investigate the balance sheet of the borrower to evaluate the borrower's financial 
standing. Also, the bank should have a right to investigate the personal background 
of a big borrower.
Another type o f risk the bank faces, other than the credit risk, is price risk. 
We hypothesise that banks should keep maximum total amount o f certain position 
involving price risks at the close of business day in order to achieve sustained
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liquidity and solvency. If, for example, a bank’s foreign exchange position is very 
high and if the exchange rate depreciates much, the loss of the bank would be very 
high, both causing illiqudity and insolvency. To prevent banks from violating this 
limit we suggest a fine system. In order that these fines be effective, fines should 
increase with violation would help.
Like all the activities involving risk, we argue that the lending process should 
have limits. For these limits to have a meaning, however, they have to be binding. 
The kind of credits to be limited may include the following:
i. Maximum risk and aggregate credit for one borrower may be limited. This 
is necessary to diversify the risk in order to decrease possible losses. Any natural 
persons who are “connected” '^^  to each other or requesting credit for the same project 
are concerned as one borrower.
ii. Maximum aggregate credit to ten big borrowers would be limited by the 
same reason of i. When there is a crises in one sector, and if more than one of the big 
borrowers are from the same sector then the loss of the bank will increase.
iii. Maximum aggregate credit that may be given to borrowers would also be 
limited. This has two reasons. Firstly, the risk would be diversified. The second 
reason is that limits also factor in any unsecured exposure in a liquidation scenario, 
that is limits help preventing liquidity problems arising from credit losses.
iv. An important problem, in the process of credit extension, is lending to 
related persons^^  ^ Most of the abuses in this process arise from the credits given to
' Although the definition of connected persons differs from law to law, as a convenience, we refer to 
persons having business relationships as connected.
 ^Although the definition of related persons differs from law to law, as a convenience, we refer to 
employees, shareholders, managers and their relatives up to second degree as related.
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shareholders, managers, employees, and such. To prevent managers from extending 
more favourable credits to the shareholders than to non-related borrowers under 
similar circumstances, it is the best principle not to give credits to shareholders. The 
second best way would be imposing strict limits on such lending if the first best, 
restriction of extending credit to shareholders, can not be satisfied. Although the 
most serious case abuses arises and leads the banks to insolvency when favourable 
credits are extended to shareholders, extending credits to manager, employees and 
other related persons have the same risk and thus we suggest limiting such credits as 
well. We further hypothesise that all credit decisions should be closely monitored, 
internally and externally, to identify and reduce problems arising from connected 
lending.
Another important issue in private lending activity is about guarantees. A tool 
for evaluating the credit risk for borrower is the calculation of the guarantees. We 
suggest the existence of well defined rules in the law to calculate the guarantees, as 
they are important both for the borrower and the bank's managers. The reason why 
these rules are necessary for the banks is that, first of all, if the rules are stated in the 
law, then the probability of abuses by the employees and managers in the cases of 
credit extension would decrease. To put it differently, limits on guarantees make risk 
evaluation easier and induce the banks not to take excess-risks in order to earn extra 
profit. As for the borrowers, they will know how much loan they would get by the 
collateral they own. As for banks, to decrease the risk factor there would be a 
restriction for a minimum amount of loans for which the borrower should offer 
guarantee. Without this limit, if only the creditworthiness of the borrower is 
concerned in the process of extending credit and if a misleading judgement has been
16
made, the loss of the bank would be high. With this limit, when the loan is not paid 
back because of a misjudgment of the borrower’s creditworthiness, or market risk, or 
price risk, the guarantee that the borrower offered would cover most of the losses.
2. Lending to the Governmenl
We hypothesise that banking laws should prevent banks carrying out 
operations with budgetary funds on the basis of concluded contracts; carrying out 
money transfers with the organs of executive power and municipal organs; providing 
credit for aimful use of budget funds allocated for the purpose of carrying out state 
and regional programs; and extending credit to government and local government to 
finance budget deficits. The role of the banking sector in the economy is to purchase 
the investments' of the depositors and to supply credit to the private sector, and 
thereby making profits. When a bank extends credit to the government, the credit 
extended to private sector would decrease, which is a negative effect for the 
development of the private sector. The profits of the bank would therefore decrease. 
Moreover, as the interest payments to the depositors decrease because of the falling 
profits of the banks, they will no more want to make investments in the banks, which 
would lead to the collapse of the banking sector.
17
C. Ownership Structure:
BCP (BCBS,1997: 15) state that:
The licensing authority should establish that new banking organisations have 
suitable shareholders, adequate financial strength, a legal structure in line 
with its operational structure, and a management with sufficient expertise and 
integrity to operate the banking sector in a sound and prudent manner.
In this perspective, there should be some restrictions on the shareholders, 
which are necessary for their suitability in the licensing process and we suggest some 
limits on the transfer of shares, thereafter, for the continuity of the suitability of the 
shareholders.
1. Restrictions on shareholders
The most important and necessary feature of a shareholder is his or her 
financial strength. In the licensing period, financial status of a shareholder is 
necessary to meet both the start-up costs and to satisfy the minimum capital required 
for licensing. The need for financial support of a shareholder continues after 
licensing, especially in cases of emergency. This is the reason why we argue that the 
reporting of the financial standing of major shareholders should be required in the 
law. BCP (BCBS,1997; 18) state it as:
If there is a coherent financial standing observed by the shareholder then that 
would mean that financial support of the shareholder would be supplied 
whenever it is necessary.
We hypothesise that the source of the capital of the bank, that is the capital of 
shareholders, should be proved. This is necessary for two reasons: The first one is
18
that the capital should not come from money-laundering process, which is the 
internationally accepted rule. The second one is that the source of the capital is a sign 
to understand the stability of the financial strength of the shareholder. The source of 
capital should allow the financial support by the shareholders in a continuous 
manner. Thus, the capital of the bank is not necessarily to be supplied with a loan 
taken from another financial institution or elsewhere.
Our argument is that other important restrictions about the shareholders 
should concern their personal background. First of all, to be a shareholder of a bank, 
both the depositors and the regulators and supervisors need to believe in their 
trustworthiness and business ethic. For this reason, bank laws may prevent directors 
and managers who are associated with bank failures in the past from becoming 
shareholders. Secondly, when shareholders are from political parties, media or non­
governmental organs, they may disturb the fair competition within the financial 
sector by influencing the public and economy. Thus, in our view, their selection as a 
shareholder should be restricted also.
We hypothesise that another major restriction should be with regards to the 
percentage of the share held by a single shareholder. The reason for this restriction is 
as follows. When there is a crisis in the sector of the shareholder, or if there is a 
problem in the financial standing of the shareholder, and if his share is high or not 
limited, then the costs of these on the bank could be very high.
Besides the restrictions on shareholders in the licensing process, we suggest 
limiting the transfer of shares thereafter so that the discipline with respect to the
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ownership structure at the licensing process can be maintained. The following 
section is about these restrictions on transfer of shares.
2. Transfer of Shares:
As mentioned above, we suggest that being a shareholder would be subject to 
a quality check. In the licensing process, the super\dsor agency analyses the 
shareholders to see whether they satisfy the criteria of ownership stated in the laws or 
not. After licensing, we argue that shareholders should continue to meet the same 
criteria, l ienee, if there is a transfer of shares the new investors, or shareholders, 
should satisfy these criteria also. In the BCP (BCBS,1997:19), Principle 4, the idea is 
stated as:
Banking supervisors must have the authority to review and reject any 
proposals to transfer significant ownership and controlling interests in 
existing banks to other parties.
This principle guarantees that, in addition to licensing new banks, banking 
supervisors should be notified of any future significant direct or indirect investment 
in the bank or any increases or other changes in the ownership over a particular 
threshold. Further, they would have the power to block such investments, or to 
prevent the exercise of voting rights in respect of such investments, if new 
shareholders do not meet the criteria comparable to those used for approving new 
banks. Notifications are often required for ownership or voting control involving 
established percentages of a bank's outstanding shares. The threshold for approval of 
significant ownership may be higher than that for notification. In this respect, we 
suggest that the supervisor would be notified when shares are to be transferred.
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While increasing or decreasing shares, when capital above a certain level reached it 
should be reported. Also when a shareholder dies, the supervisor may prohibit the 
business if the new shareholder does not satisfy the criteria.
D. Directors and Managers
An important step in the licensing process is the evaluation of the 
competence, integrity and qualifications of proposed management, including the 
board of directors. For this reason, we hypothesise that regulators should investigate 
the proposed directors and senior managers before licensing in order to consider 
individually and collectively their banking experience, other business experience, 
personal integrity and relevant skills. This investigation may involve background 
checks on whether previous activities, including regulatory or juridical judgements, 
raise doubts concerning their competence, sound judgement or history. It, 
furthermore, involves investigating the history and experience of both top managers 
and other managers.
Another important subject is the managers' trustworthiness. In order to make 
certain of their trustworthiness, the law may prohibit the selection of directors or 
managers who were, in the past, associated with bank failures as a director or 
manager.
We suggest dual control for the management of a bank, which means that at 
least two managers' approval is obtained in any important banking activity. This is a
21
caution against the possible abuses in case of one manager taking control. Two 
managers' control is considered to be safer.
E. Reporting Recording
As mentioned before, banking system is a profit-seeking sector that uses risk 
management. Therefore, it is important to prevent the banks from incurring excessive 
losses by monitoring them. In this respect, an effective reporting-recording system is 
very important. Recording-reporting system involves many aspects. The main aspect 
concerned here are: Operating plan, systems of control and internal organisation; 
financial projection; cross border banking; external auditing; and coverage of 
reporting and recording.
1. Operating plan, systems of control and internal organisation
A system of effective internal controls is a critical component of bank 
management and a foundation for the safe and sound operation of banking 
organisations. BCBS {Framework for hneriial Control Systems in Banking 
Organisations, 1998:1) states:
A system of effective internal controls may help to ensure that the goals and 
objectives of a banking organisation will be met and the bank achieve long 
term profitability targets and maintain reliable financial and managerial 
reporting.
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Such a syslem would help to guarantee that the bank will comply with laws 
and regulations as well as policies, plans, internal rules and procedures and decrease 
the risk of unexpected losses and the probability of damages to the bank's reputation.
As the syslem of internal control is essential for the stability of the whole 
financial system, one needs to define the principles for assessing internal control 
systems. BCP define these major systems as well as the role and duties of the board 
of directors with respect to them.
The board of directors may approve and periodically review the overall 
business strategies and significant policies of the bank; understanding the major risks 
of the bank; setting the levels for risk; identifying, monitoring and measuring the 
risk; and promoting high ethical and integrity standards. Hence, the board of 
directors has an important role in the internal control system, which is an essential 
part of the banking system. This leads to the issue of the competence and integrity of 
the board of directors. In this respect, we argue that the law should give detailed 
information about not only the systems of control and internal organisations, but also 
the qualifications and duties of managers of the board.
Although the role of the board of directors is vital in the internal control 
system, the internal auditors have important duties as well. In Principle 11, of the 
BCP (BCBS,1997), this is stated as:
There should be an effective and comprehensive internal audit of the internal 
control system carried out by operationally independent, appropriately trained 
and component staff. The internal audit function, as part of the monitoring of 
the system o f internal controls, should report directly to the board of directors 
or its audit committee.
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Principle 12 states that as:
Internal control deficiencies, whether identified by business line, internal 
audit or other control personnel, should be reported in a timely manner to the 
appropriate management level and addressed promptly. Material internal 
control deficiencies should be reported to senior management and the board 
of directors.
Thus the law should state the qualifications of the internal auditor to 
guarantee their competence, business ethic and appropriateness for this duty.
2. Financial Projections
With regards to the licensing process, we hypothesise that the licensing 
agency should consider whether the new bank's policy is liable to the economy, 
whether the bank could cover the start-up costs and early operational losses, and 
whether the aim of the bank is consistent with the general policies of the macro­
economy of the country. The way that the licensing agency would find the answers to 
these indefinite issues would be by requiring the projected balance sheets and 
commercial plans covering long periods. By means of these projections, the agency 
could also analyse the plans of the new bank, explicitly, and obtain enough 
information about their feasibility, consistency and viability.
3. Cross Border Banking
When the proposed owner is a foreign bank, we argue that the approval of the 
home country is to be required. To give a licence to a bank, the licensing agency
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should make sure that system's effectiveness are monitored regularly so that the 
banking activity continues in a healthy way. On the other hand, the banking activity 
of a bank, whether it is an international bank or not, is monitored and supervised by 
home supervisors. Thus, before giving a licence we argue that the licensing authority 
should contact the home country supervisor and take their approval to make sure that 
the bank is monitored and supervised in a prudent manner.
4. External Aiidiling
We hypothesise that the supervisory agency should not only get information 
about the banking activities regularly and in a prudent manner, but also validate 
them. On-site examination is a major way to get information and it may be done 
either by the staff of the supervisory agency or the external auditors, or by both of 
them. Using both external auditing and the supervisory staff for on-site examination 
is an effective choice for this activity to provide independent verification about 
whether adequate corporate governance exists in individual banks and the 
information provided by banks is reliable. Although the supervisory agency has the 
right to reject the auditing agency if they believe that they are not reliable, double 
control would be better and prevent any abuses that would arise in examinations.
The matters that the supervisor would verify by means of on-site 
examinations are stated in the BCP (BCBS,1997: 33),as:
* The accuracy of reports received from the bank
* The overall operations and condition o f the bank
* The adequacy o f the bank's risks management systems and internal control
procedures
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* The quality of the loan portfolio and adequacy of loan loss provisions and 
reserves
* The competence of management
* The adequacy of accounting and management information systems
* Issues identified in off-site or previous on-site supervisory process
* Bank adherence to laws and regulations and the terms stipulated in the 
banking licence
We argue that the supervisory agency should set clear guidelines related to 
the frequency and scope of such examinations. Also, the procedures and policies of 
the examination should be set clearly to ensure that examinations are conducted in a 
thorough and consistent manner with clear objectives to obtain the information listed 
above explicitly.
In order to ensure these, we hypothesise that laws should contain these 
criteria. In laws, on-site examination by both the supervisory staff and the auditing 
agency should be stated as compulsory. The higher the frequency of on-site checks, 
the more effective is monitoring and prompt of realisation of deficiencies earlier. To 
obtain all the information necessary from on-site checks, we suggest a well-defined 
scope for the auditing reports to exist. The most imponant information that should be 
obtained from an auditing is the irregularities and deficiencies of the bank.
5. Coverage of Reporting and Recording
Thorough understanding of the financial institution's operations whether by 
on-site or off-site examination is vital for the supervision of the institution. We argue 
that the various factors considered during the licensing process should be 
periodically assessed as part of the ongoing supervision. Review o f reports o f
26
internal and external auditing can be an integral part of the monitoring process. 
Banks should submit information periodically in order that the supervisor agency 
reviews the business of the bank on a consolidated basis. For this purpose, the reports 
should include basic financial statements as well as supporting schedules that provide 
greater detail on exposure to different types of risk and various other financial 
aspects of the bank, including provisions and off-balance sheet activities. By the help 
of these reports the supervisor would be able to check adherence to prudential 
requirements, such as capital adequacy or single debtor limits. These reports can be 
used to identify trends not only for particular institutions, but also for the banking 
system as a whole. We argue that this information then would be verified 
periodically through on-site examinations and internal audits.
When a problem arises, the bank should consult it with the supervisor. We 
hypothesise that the bank should also inform the supervisor in case of deficiencies or 
when things go wrong.
In this respect, annual balance sheets, the main source of understanding the 
financial position of a bank, should be reported. We suggest that the banking law 
should contain a basis for the frequency of such reports. It is important for the 
supervisory agency to obtain information about the bank's business in order to record 
the deficiencies as soon as possible. The scope of these reports should be designed 
before hand, as the details that are needed for the supervisors would also be stated in 
the reports.
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On the other hand, some information may not be detected from periodical 
reports. We argue that one such information that should also be reported is the 
change in the charter of the bank.
To sum up, we argue that supervisory agencies should make sure that each 
bank provides adequate accounting reports with consistent accounting policies and 
practices that enables the supervisor to obtain a true and fair view of the financial 
condition of the bank and the profitability of its business.
F. Corrective Action
Although the supervisory agency monitors the bank in a regular and prudent 
manner things can still go wrong. The bank may not follow the rules, or even if it 
does, losses of the bank may still increase. In order to protect both depositors and the 
banking system as a whole, we argue that supervisory agency would intervene in 
these situations. The intervention of the supervisor should differ, however, from case 
to case. If the solvency of the bank is doubtful and the managers are not capable of 
solving the problem, the supervisory agent may give a start to a comprehensive 
program under the management of a consetv'ator. To clear up questions or problems 
that are likely to arise, however, the situations where the conservatorship’s 
management may start should be defined explicitly.
In many cases, the profitability and the solvency of the bank are related to 
each other and may affect the whole financial system. When a bank has a liquidity
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problem, supervisory agent should determine its reasons explicitly and should 
identify the conditions under which liquidation would prevent the bank from 
insolvency. Thus, we argue that the supervisory agency should be cautious about 
extending credit and observe the differences between the cases of illiquidation and 
insolvency.
When a bank faces a problem of losses, the supervisory agent should follow 
the case well to prevent the financial system and depositors from bankruptcy. Thus, 
after a bank loses at most one third of its liable capital, we hypothesise that 
supervisor should liquidate the bank and take its license back.
In cases of problems such as above, or in cases that the conservatorship 
would not solve the problem, or in cases when the supervisor makes the judgement 
that there is nothing more to do to solve the bank's problem and deficiencies, the 
supervisor would liquidate the bank. We argue that the cases that would result in 
liquidation should also be defined in the law.
G. Regulatory agent
Despite the ongoing debate regarding the necessity of regulation in the 
financial markets, financial institutions have been regulated, in some way. Given 
this, the issue at hand is the selection of the regulatory agent who could provide a 
relatively healthier financial system.
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When the regulator is an independent authority, the only role of the authority 
should be to set rules for the health of the financial system. The authority should 
observe the deficiencies without the effects of powerful committees or government 
and concentrate on only the regulation of the bank.
The central bank can be that independent authority, as it has the power of 
lender of last resort. When a bank faces a financial problem, the final authority that 
could rescue would therefore be the central bank. To reduce or eliminate political 
influence on the process of bank regulation, an independent central bank is a good 
choice for a regulatory agent.
In case the government is the regulator, political preferences may prevent the 
fairness and effectiveness in regulation. Thus, an independent authorisation is 
preferred to government for the role of regulation.
Proponents of self-regulation, on the other hand, argue that the financial 
market would overcome its problems and work in the way like the Adam Smith's 
invisible hand. The counter argument, however, is that because there exist linkages 
between banks, industries and the government sectors and because the central bank 
has the power of lender of last resort, the argument for self-regulation has an 
important deficiency. Without a regulatory body banks can not overcome a systemic 
risk which is a result of a collapse of a part of or the whole banking system. Thus, the 
market is not independent and needs intervention, especially in the case of crises.
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The questions about the regulatory agent are also valid for the supervisory 
agent. In many countries, like Australia, Netherlands and Switzerland, the 
supervision is currently done by independent authorities, whereas formerly the 
function was vested with the government. The reasoning provided for this is that the 
supervision of a country's financial system is important for the overall economy, and 
is an ongoing process, thus, it should not be affected from politics or new policies. 
An independent authority should do the supervision on a consolidated basis without 
the effects of politics.
On the other hand, because of its lender of last resort power the central bank 
has an effect on the superx'ision. Central bank, therefore, may share the supervisory 
role with an independent authority and the bank council. In this manner, it would be 
easier to discuss the problems and consult the bank. Although it is better if the bank 
council is involved in the supervision for consultancy and frequent discussions, 
supervision can be done without them also.
Central bank is related to the supervision activity because of its extending 
credit facility. Whether it is the supervisor or not, the central bank should monitor 
and analyse the bank before the extension of credit. Thus, in many countries the 
supervision is done by the central bank.
H. Supei'visiory Agency
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If the central bank is not independent, the role of the supervision may as well 
be shared by the government. Otherwise, as for reputation, it is better for supervision 
to be separated from politics, as well.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY: DERIVATION OF THE INDEX OF RS
Even though measuring the quality of banking regulation and supervision is 
difficult, it is crucial as it helps to compare countries with respect to their potential of 
financial stability. For this reason, based on the criteria list of Chapter 2, we provide 
a numerical index of the quality of banking regulation and supervision in order to 
evaluate the banking laws. Our data set is cross-sectional and it consists of nineteen 
transition economies. The evaluation criteria are applied to all banking laws enacted 
in these countries since 1989. We, therefore, obtain twenty-four observations since 
five of these countries have enacted banking laws twice since then.
3.1. Coding Legal Regulation and Supervision
To evaluate the quality of regulation and supervision in a banking system, we 
set up our coding system by utilising three sources of information. First, we consider 
the theoretical literature with regards to the issues we cover in our coding system. 
Second, we take the “Basle Core Principles for Effective Supervision” as a guideline 
and cover all the ideas outlined in the 25 principles in our criteria list. However, 
these principles do not include all the items that we consider relevant, especially for 
regulation. “The Basle Core Principles”, only provide the ideas for improving
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supervision in a country while they do not explicitly define the implementation 
techniques, which we also include in our coding system to evaluate the banking laws. 
Third, we study the banking laws of the sample countries to develop our criteria list. 
As our sample countries are confined to the transition economies, this coverage may 
limit our coding system in many ways. With the expansion of the sample to include 
developing countries, which we plan to undertake shortly, we expect to see both the 
list of criteria and the coding system to be expanded or modified due to a wider range 
of areas covered. Using all these sources facilitates the derivation of a coding system 
that can be used to rank the quality of legal regulation and supervision in transition 
economies.
We group the legal issues regarding banking regulation and supervision in the 
banking laws into eight clusters;
A. Capital requirements
B. Lending
C. Ownership structure
D. Directors and Managers
E. Reporting and recording
F. Corrective action
G. Regulatory agency
H. Supervisory Agency
These clusters were built up from 72 different criteria, which we report in 
Appendix A. The numbers in Appendix A are set such that the higher the number the 
more effective regulation and supervision. We then transform each of these numbers
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on to a scale of 0 (lowest level of effective regulation and supervision) to 1 (highest 
level of effective regulation and supervision).
This study analyses the banking laws of the transition economies starting 
1989 till now. Some of the countries have two banking laws in the period indicated. 
Different laws of a country in different periods carry different information for our 
analysis as they may involve important legislative changes. The coded variables 
appear in Appendix B.
3.2. Aggregating the Coded Variables
The 72 components of the quality of regulation and supervision are 
aggregated in three steps to yield a hierarchy of indexes. The basic data on the 72 
disaggregated variables that are described in Appendix A were first aggregated into 
16 legal variables using equal weights for each of the components.
The 16 variables were then aggregated into the 8 major variables that we list 
above by the following rule. The three variables labelled as Minimum Capital at 
Licensing, Capital Adequacy and Major Acquisitions and Investments were 
aggregated into a single variable labelled as Capital Requirements, calculated as the 
average of its four components. The two variables for limiting the lending to the 
private sector and the government were averaged with equal weights into a single 
variable named as Lending. The variable Ownership Structure is formed also as the 
unweighted average of the two variables: Restrictions on Shareholders and Transfer
35
Table 1. Variables That Measure the Quality of Regulation and Supervision
A1 A2 A3 B1 B2 Cl C2 D1 El E2 E3 E4 E5 FI G1 HI
ALBENIA 96 0.50 0.25 0.15 0.05 0.25 0.28 0.00 0.28 0.50 0.33 0.00 0.75 0.40 0.50 0.75 0.50
ARMENIA 93 0.50 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.48 0.13 0.75 0.50
ARMENIA 96 0.50 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.08 0.00 0.50 0.56 1.00 0.46 0.12 0.25 0.75 0.50
AZERBAIJAN 92 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.40 0.00 0.75 0.50
AZERBAIJAN 96 0.50 0.25 0.52 0.06 0.25 0.14 0.25 0.22 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.80 0.63 0.75 0.50
BELARUS 92 0.50 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.04 0.40 0.00 0.75 0.50
BULGARIA 92 0.50 0.25 0.42 0.33 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.46 0.56 0.38 0.75 0.50
CROATIA 93 1.00 0.50 0.19 0.08 0.25 0.00 0.58 0.28 0.50 0.22 1.00 0.32 0.40 0.00 0.75 0.50
CROATIA 96 1.00 0.50 0.19 0.13 0.25 0.17 0.58 0.17 0.50 0.22 1.00 0.32 0.52 0.00 0.75 0.50
CZECK 92 0.50 0.00 0.42 0.09 0.00 0.22 0.11 0.00 0.25 0.33 1.00 0.18 0.40 0.50 0.50 0.50
CZECH 94 1.00 0.00 0.42 0.09 0.00 0.22 0.11 0.11 0.25 0.67 1.00 0.18 0.40 0.50 0.50 0.50
GEORGIA 96 0.50 0.25 0.13 0.00 0.25 0.24 0.22 0.17 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.82 0.44 0.50 0.75 0.50
HUNGARY 94 1.00 0.50 0.46 0.27 0.00 0.53 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.89 0.92 0.25 0.75 1.00
KAZAKHISTAN 93 0.50 0.25 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.33 1.00 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.50
KAZAKHISTAN 95 0.50 0.25 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.33 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.46 0.40 0.00 0.75 0.50
KRGYZSTAN 91 0.50 0.25 0.21 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.32 0.44 0.25 0.75 0.50
LITHUANIA 92 0.50 0.25 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.17 0.25 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.18 0.40 0.25 0.75 0.50
MACEDONIA 94 1.00 0.25 0.25 0.18 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.40 0.50 0.75 0.50
MOLDOVA 91 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.75 0.50
MONGOLIA 91 1.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.40 0.00 0.50 0.50
POLAND 89 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.08 0.47 0.00 0.25 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.38 0.50 0.50
SLOVAK 92 1.00 0.00 0.42 0.09 0.00 0.22 0.11 0.11 0.25 0.67 1.00 0.18 0.40 0.50 0.50 0.50
TAJIKISTAN 94 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.75 0.50
UZBEKISTAN 91 0.50 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.29 0.40 0.00 0.75 0.50
LO
ON
Notes: 1. Accompanying the country names are the years in which the banking laws are enacted. As can be seen in the table,
2. The variables A1 to H1 are enumerated based on the sixteen criteria which are reported in Appendix A.
3. All variables are normalised between 0 and 1, such that when a variable takes the value of 1, it indicates the largest 
banking law that variable intends to measure.
4. All data are obtained from the banking laws.
, five of the nineteen countries in the sample have enacted tv/o banking laws.
degree of quality of bank regulation and supervision, with respect to the particular aspect of the
of Shares. The five variables Operating Plan Systems o f Control and Internal 
Organtsatton, Financial Projection, Cross-border Banktng, On-.site Supervision, and 
Coverage o f Recording and Reporting were aggregated into a single variable that is 
labelled as Reporting and Recording. The other variables, Directors and Managers, 
Corrective Action, Regulatory Agency and Supervisory Agency are taken as the 
major variables without being aggregated. The eight aggregated variables are 
presented in Table 2.
The eight variables obtained from the second round of aggregation were 
aggregated further into a single index for each countr>' with equal weights. The 
aggregated index is indicated in Table 2 as the index of the quality of regulation and 
supervision, RS. We use this index as the measure of the quality of regulation and 
supervision (in legal terms) in a country. In the next section of this chapter, we 
analyse the properties of the individual variables and the RS index.
3.3. Some Characteristics of the Aggregated Variables
When we aggregate the variables that comprise RS, we naturally lose some of 
the information that the individual components carry. In Chapter 4, we nevertheless 
use only the final index, RS, due to the data limitations in performing a regression 
analysis. In this section, however, we analyse the legal variables in Table 1 and Table 
2, individually. This analysis provides us a more detailed information about the 
common weaknesses of the banking laws of the transition countries and may thus 
suggest the necessary improvements in the legislation o f these countries.
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TABLE 2: Eight Aggregate Variables of Banking Regulation and Supervision, and the Aggregate Index (RS)
A. Capital 
Requirements
B. Lending C. Ownership 
Structure
D, Directors 
and Managers
E. Reporting/ 
Recording
F. Corrective 
Action
G. Regulatory 
Agency
H. Supervisory 
Agency
RS
ALBENIA 96 0.30 0.15 0.14 0.28 0.40 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.38
ARMENIA 93 0.25 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.31 0.13 0.75 0.50 0.25
ARMENIA 96 0.26 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.53 0.25 0.75 0.50 0.31
AZERBAIJAN 92 0.17 0.13 0.19 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.75 0.50 0.25
AZERBAIJAN 96 0.42 0.16 0.19 0.22 0.32 0.63 0.75 0.50 0.40
BELARUS 92 0.25 0.25 0.08 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.75 0.50 0.24
BULGARIA 92 0.39 0.16 0.08 0.33 0.40 0.38 0.75 0.50 0.37
CROATIA 93 0.56 0.17 0.29 0.28 0.49 0.00 0.75 0.50 0.38
CROATIA 96 0.56 0.19 0.38 0.17 0.51 0.00 0.75 0.50 0.38
CZECK 92 0.31 0.05 0.17 0.00 0.43 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.35
CZECH 94 0.47 0.05 0.17 0.11 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.31
GEORGIA 96 0.29 0.13 0.23 0.17 0.72 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.41
HUNGARY 94 0.65 0.14 0.39 0.50 0.61 0.25 0.75 1.00 0.54
KAZAKHISTAN 93 0.27 0.00 0.04 0.17 0.32 0.00 0.75 0.50 0.26
KAZAKHISTAN 95 0.25 0.03 0.17 0.33 0.42 0.00 0.75 0.50 0.31
KRGYZSTAN 91 0.32 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.25 0.75 0.50 0.27
LITHUANIA 92 0.25 0.04 0.21 0.00 0.42 0.25 0.75 0.50 0.30
MACEDONIA 94 0.50 0.09 0.15 0.00 0.24 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.34
MOLDOVA 91 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.75 0.50 0.19
MONGOLIA 91 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.19
POLAND 89 0.17 0.05 0.28 0.00 0.30 0.38 0.50 0.50 0.31
SLOVAK 92 0.31 0.05 0.17 0.00 0.43 0.50 ^  0.50 0.50 0.35
TAJIKISTAN 94 0.17 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.75 0.50 0.21
UZBEKISTAN 91 0.25 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.75 0.50 0.23
00
Note: For the notes see Table 1, from which these aggregates are obtained in the form of unweighted averages of the catagories under the main headings of A to H.
When we analyse the data in Table 1, the first observation is that there are 
many countries whose legal variables take the value of zero. This means that 
although we use a wide range of coding criteria to observe the variations for 
regulation and supervision among the countries, the quality of the legislation in 
transition countries are even below those standards.
Another observation based on Table 1 is that the countries where there are 
two banking laws have improved legislation for regulation and supervision. Besides, 
the first banking laws the transition countries have adopted appear quite similar to 
each other. After the first law, a period that usually coincides with their political and 
economic reforms, some of these countries (Armenia (1996), Azerbaijan (1996), 
Czech (1994), Kazakhistan (1995)) appear to have adopted more improved banking 
laws (Table 1, Table 2).
We may analyse the 8 major variables one by one. The aggregated variable 
measuring the effectiveness of the rules for capital requirements largely varies 
among the countries. The maximum observed value of this variable is 0.653 for the 
1994 law of Hungary. Hungarian banking law also gets the highest rank with regards 
to the overall index of regulation and supervision. The capital adequacy variable is 
the lowest component of this aggregated variable (see column A2 of Table 1). This 
observation would be translated, as transition countries in general do not have 
satisfactory restrictions for capital.
The second aggregated variable. Lending, shows the quality o f the law with 
regards to lending restrictions. As we mentioned in Chapter 2, most o f the serious
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The areas that need improvements are mainly the Operating Plan and Systems o f 
Control and Financial Projections (see Table 2). The low mean values of these two 
variables, which are the sub-variables of Reporting and Recording, show that the 
countries are weak mainly in these fields.
Perhaps because the countries newly established market systems, the 
corrective action parts are generally weak in the banking laws of transition 
economies. However, since the immediate and expansive restructuring in the banking 
system would frequently require corrective action, the regulations in this area should 
therefore be revised.
Although there are unsolved discussions in the literature about who should be 
the regulatory agency and supervisory agency, these roles are generally performed by 
the central banks in majority of the transition countries. We outline this debate, along 
with the preferences of the developed countries, in Chapter 2
Finally, we can comment on the general structure of the regulation and 
supervision in transition countries by using the aggregate index, RS, We observe that 
the countr}' with the highest quality of regulation and supervision is Hungary and the 
one with the lowest quality is Moldavia. Generally, we can not indicate that the 
transition countries’ banks are regulated and supervised in a prudent manner or their 
quality for regulation and supervision vary greatly among the group. The mean of the 
RS in this sample is 0.3054, which is much lower than 1, and only one country 
exceeds the value of 0.5, which indicates that there is much room for improvements 
in the banking laws of transition economies to lead to a more stable financial system.
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Finally, the credit extension policies of the banks in transition countries get the 
lowest values among all the variables. Hence, the starting point for any adjustment in 
banking laws could be this point, while many other points should be improved also.
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CHAPTER 4
INFLATION AND BANK REGULATION AND SUPERVISION
Do countries with more effective bank regulation and supervision have lower 
rates of inflation? This paper contributes to the literature on the effects of 
macroeconomic institutions on inflation by providing a preliminary investigation of 
the linkage between inflation and bank regulation and supervision.
Banks’ main aim is to increase their profits, and they often do not have to 
care about the health of the banking system as a whole. Central banks are, however, 
usually vested with powers to perform this duty “In Western economies, central 
banks emerged as a response to the needs of financial institutions and to serve other 
banks,” writes Wooley. Central banks and financial institutions are closely linked, 
whether or not central banks perform the role of the supervising authority.
If bank regulation and supervision in a country is not effective, this may lead 
the financial system to instability. This may prove to be costly for the central banks, 
because of their role as the lender of last resort and the creditor of the banks. 
Although in some countries central banks do not perform the role of banking 
regulation and supervision, they are still responsible for maintaining financial 
stability. When financial system is unstable, banks are often unable to cover up their 
liabilities. This would generate an extra cost for the central banks, leading them to 
print money in order to finance the banks’ liabilities. This situation affects the policy 
of the central banks in two ways. First, the central bank may need to deviate from its
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main role of maintaining price stability in order to maintain the financial stability. 
Second, because of printing extra money inflation will increase.
A stable and developed financial market serves as an important source of 
non-inflationary government finance. When, on the other hand, the financial market 
is weak, government resorts to the central bank money in order to finance its 
expenditures. The resultant inflation, in turn, inhibits the development of strong 
financial institutions. Moreover, when financial markets are weak, industrialists are 
likely to rely on government credits or government transfers. In such cases, the 
government needs additional resources to cover the credit needs of the private sector. 
Creation of such additional resources is usually possible with only inflationary 
policies. Thus, inefficient financial markets usually lead to inflationary policies.
As unanticipated infiation leads to deterioration in the value of long-term 
loans, it is detrimental to the interests of financial institutions. Hence, if banks are 
organised as a powerful lobby they can force the government to follow anti- 
inflationary politics (so argue Posen (1994)). Such organised anti-inflationary 
incentives are especially possible in a well-developed financial system. Since bank 
regulation and supervision is likely to be closely linked with financial sector 
development, then inflation and degree of bank regulation and supervision is likely to 
be closely -inversely- related also.
There is also an indirect effect of bank regulation and supervision on inflation 
via budget deficits. When bank regulation and supervision is not prudent, financial 
fragility arises. Moreover, financial fragility results in fiscal fragility, in other words
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high budget deficits. When both the financial markets and tax collection mechanisms 
do not work properly in order to provide the government with the resources it needs, 
the central bank monetises the deficit and that leads to inflation. Thus, financial 
prudence via bank regulation and supervision may also prevent inflation by inducing 
fiscal prudence.
Further, we should mention that the relationship between inflation and bank 
regulation and supervision is not a one way causality. Till now, we emphasised the 
possible negative effects of regulation and supervision on inflation. However, it may 
be the case that inflation itself affects the degree of bank regulation and supervision. 
Moreover, this effect may be both positive and negative. In what follows, we 
elaborate on these effects.
In a high inflation environment, the goal of the government would normally 
be to decrease inflation. If there exists a stable and developed financial market, then 
banks can allocate the funds for maximum profits and generate funds through their 
own operations rather than through central bank or government lending. Thus, a 
developed financial system usually offers non-or less inflationary means to finance 
the budget. When following disinflation policies, therefore, the first goal is to 
strengthen the financial system. For this reason, government tries to improve the 
quality of the regulation and supervision This shows the positive effect of inflation 
on regulation and supervision.
The effect of inflation on bank supervision and regulation can be negative 
also. If we consider the case of low inflation the goal of the government would be to
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increase the growth of the country without increasing the inflation. The tool that the 
government wants to use would be the financial sector. As Levine, et al (1999) show 
that financial market development has a large impact on economic grov^h. In order 
to strengthen the financial system, in turn, good regulation and supervision should be 
attained.
When inflation is high, and chronic, however, there may exist inflation 
lobbies that also benefit from a weak financial system. Directed credits and 
imprudent bank lending are some of the mechanisms of the linkage between high 
inflation and weak financial sector. In such a case, establishing prudent bank 
regulation and supervision may be difficult. This argument contradicts with the 
positive effect of bank regulation and supervision on inflation, rendering the 
investigation of two ways causality between inflation and regulation and supervision 
rather difficult.
In this paper, we examine the direct effects of regulation and supervision on 
inflation. However, we do not investigate the effects of inflation on bank regulation 
and supervision in this paper, as the sign of that relationship is indefinite. In a further 
study, we plan to extend this study by examining the relationship between bank 
regulation and supervision and budget deficits.
In the remainder of this chapter, we investigate the claim that, although 
effective banking regulation and supervision is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for low inflation, other things being equal, ineffective banking regulation 
and supervision contributes to higher inflation. This study draws mainly on the
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studies of Cukierman, Webb, Neyapli (1992) and Cukierman, Miller, Neyapti (CMN, 
1999), which both analyse the role of institutions on inflation determination. The 
study of de Melo, Denizer and Gelb (1996) suggests that inflation is negatively 
related to the degree of liberalization of the economy, CMN show that controlling for 
the level of market liberalization, the lack of central bank independence contributes 
to higher inflation. In this paper, controlling for both degree of liberalization and 
legal central bank independence we estimate the effects of the quality of banking 
regulation and supervision (RS) on inflation. Hence, we analyse whether the measure 
of RS improves the relationships derived in the afore mentioned studies or not.
4.1 Inflation, Banking Regulation and Supervision, Central Bank 
Independence and Cumulative Degree of Liberalization - a first look
To observe the relationships of banking regulation and supervision; degree of 
liberalization of the economy; and legal central bank independence with inflation we 
first provide indexes for each of these institutional variables for transition economies. 
The indexes are reported in Table 3. The first column of Table 3 provides the index 
of banking regulation and supervision, the derivation of which we explain explicitly 
in Chapter 3.
The second column represents the index of legal central bank independence, 
LVAW, constructed by Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (CWN, 1992). This index is 
based on the coding of sixteen characteristics of central bank (CB) charters, 
including the allocation of authority over monetary policy, procedures for resolution
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Table 3: Variables used in the Regression: 
Post Enactment Period Averages
rs 1 c u 1 LWAV
ALBENIA 96, 92 0.376 4.560 0.470 0.205
ARMENIA 93, 93 0.252 1.930 0.290 0.593
ARMENIA 96, 96 0.306 3.370 0.740 0.090
AZERBAIJAN 92, 92 0.252 1.250 0.223 0.705
AZERBAIJAN 96, 96 0.399 2.640 0.252 0.035
BELARUS 92, 92 0.243 1.790 0.730 0.657
BULGARIA 92, 91 0.375 3.805 0.500 0.490
CROATIA 93, 92 0.380 4.830 0.440 0.180
CROATIA 96, 92 0.382 6.530 0.440 0.040
CZECK 92, 91 0.306 5.965 0.690 0.085
CZECH 94, 91 0.349 1.840 0.690 0.130
GEOGIA 96, 95 0.410 3.260 0.736 0.055
HUNGARY 94, 91 0.536 6.375 0.670 0.173
KAZAKHISTAN 93, 0.257 1.310 0.320 0.795
KAZAKHISTAN 95, 0.307 3.390 0.440 0.167
KRGYZSTAN 91, 92 0.275 3.060 0.520 0.413
LITHUANIA 92,91 0.301 2.720 0.275 0.522
LITHUANIA 92, 96 0.301 5.390 0.778 0.065
MACEDONIA 94, 95 0.341 6.340 0.410 0.017
MOLDOVA 91, 91 0.190 1.345 0.383 0.705
MOLDOVA 91, 95 0.190 3.800 0.730 0.123
MONGOLIA 91, 91 0.194 2.270 0.429 0.590
POLAND 89, 91 0.271 5.030 0.460 0.204
SLOVAK 92, 92 0.306 4.760 0.620 0.095
TAJIKISTAN 94, 93 0.208 1.985 0.360 0.610
UZBEKISTAN 91, 91 0.235 1.690 0.410 0.631
Mean of the series 0.306 3.509 0.500 0.322
Median of the series 0.304 3.315 0.450 0.631
Note: Years next to countries indicate the enactment years of banking laws and 
central bank laws, respectively.
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of conflicts between the CB and government, the relative importance of price 
stability among the CB objectives as stated in the law, the seriousness of limitations 
on lending by the CB to the government, and the procedures for the appointment and 
dismissal of the governor of the CB.
The third column represents the cumulative liberalization index, CLl, 
developed by de Melo, Denizer and Gelb (1996), We use CLl in the same way and 
by the same reasons with CMN. Therefore, we report the properties of CLl from 
CMN.
The cumulative degree of liberalization in a given year is defined as a simple 
sum of the degrees of liberalization (LI) up to and including the current year. 
The yearly liberalization index, in turn, is a weighted average (with weights 
0,3, 0.3 and 0.4) of the degree of liberalization in the following areas: internal 
markets (1), external markets (E) and the private sector entry (P). The 
rationale for using a cumulative, rather than a yearly, index of liberalization is 
that, at any given time, economic performance is affected by the degree of 
liberalization at that time, as well as by the length of time that particular 
reforms have been in effect.
The fourth column is the inflation rate. However, instead of taking inflation 
directly, we transform it into the rate of depreciation in the real value of money (D) 
in order to reduce heteroskedasticity of the error term and thus improve the 
efficiency of the estimate, following the method of CWN. D is defined as:
D = 71/(1 +7l)
where n is the average inflation rate. D is naturally bounded between zero and one. 
We prefer this measure because of the following two advantages over the rate of 
inflation. First, it diminishes the influence of outliers. This is an important 
consideration due to the wide variations in the inflation rate in the sample countries. 
Using the straight inflation rate would give undue weight to the outlier observations 
like the three digit inflation rates, common to transition economies in the early
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]990’s. Second, D is a more meaningful measure of the impact of inflation on 
individuals than the rate of inflation. This consideration is not important at low rates 
of inflation since at low rates the divergence between two measures is negligible. But 
at high rates, of the kind that has been experienced by a good number of countries in 
our sample, the divergence become clear.
4.2. Selection of Time Coverage
For our study, we use the indexes for the post enactment periods of both the 
banking laws and central banks laws. The reason for this treatment is to give equal 
importance to both of these laws. Our sample consists of nineteen transition 
countries, for which we have data. Table 3 reports two years next to each country 
where the first year represents the enactment year of the banking law and the second 
year represents the enactment year of the central bank law. When a country holds 
two rows, it may be either due to the enactment of two banking laws, or two central 
bank laws, in that case, the first raw stands for the first enactment of the law that was 
later revised in that country and the second raw for the second enactment year of that 
law, which may either be the banking law or the central bank law. This leads to a 
total of twenty-six observations since seven of the nineteen countries have revised 
either their banking laws or central bank laws.
The following explains the definition of time periods over which the variables 
are considered. If a country has only one banking law and one central bank law, and 
if their enactment years are the same, then CLI and D take the average values in the
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post enactment year, which ends in 1998. In case, the enactment years for banking 
law and central bank law are different, then CLI and D take the average values in the 
post enactment year of either central bank law or banking law depending on which 
has the latest enactment year. If there are two laws for either banking law or central 
bank law, we take the first law’s post enactment period, as in the case there is one 
law, but ending with the enactment year of the second law, to evaluate the averages 
of CLI and D, For the second law, taking the other type of law being the same (either 
the banking or central bank laws), the post enactment period ends at 1998 and the 
average values of CLI and D are calculated for this period. These criteria explain 
why for some countries in Table 3 there are two rows with different years attached.
Before we examine the relation between the variables LVAW, RS, CLI and 
inflation more systematically, we analyse Table 3 to observe the general 
characteristics of the variables and the relations among them. In the bottom of the 
table, we provide the mean and the median of the series. By taking these parameters 
as a starting point, we examine the series as follows. In the first three series, RS, CLI 
and LVAW, we hypothesise that if the observations are below the median or the 
mean (or a number around the median), then inflation should also be below its 
median or mean, respectively. We see that this inle generally holds, and that is there 
is a negative relationship between inflation and RS, CLI and LVAW. There are, 
however, some outliers. In some of the countries, the institutional variables do not 
follow the same trend. When two of them are below their median, for example, the 
other one is above its median. However, these outliers do not disturb our general 
inference. In some of these countries, one of the first three variables is much higher 
or lower than the average, so that it compensates the opposite effect of the other
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variable. On the other hand, in Bulgaria, although all the first three variables are 
above their median, there is still higher inflation than average. We do not view this 
case as an unexpected one, however, because we do not hypothesise that these 
variables are the necessary and sufficient conditions for lower inflation, or that they 
explain inflation completely There are many other structural characteristics that may 
cause high inflation in a country. Thus, Bulgaria may have other structural problems 
that cause high inflation. Also, we should remind once more that the indexes only 
account for the legal characteristics, and not the actual performances.
We thus obtain a pooled cross section - time series sample with, at most 2 
periods for each country, as reported in Table 3. We are now in a position to make a 
regression analysis by using this data.
4.3 Regression Analysis
Previous studies, by Cukierman, Webb, Neyapti (1992), Denizer, Melo and 
Gelb (1996), and Cukierman, Miller, Neyapti (1998) analyse the relationships 
between inflation and LVAW and CLl in their regressions. The results support the 
negative relation of inflation with central bank independence and liberalization. In 
this study, we examine systematically the relation between banking regulation and 
supervision and inflation and we hypothesise that banking regulation and supervision 
further improves these relations.
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To test our hypothesis, we first regress infiation over RS (Table 4, case 1). 
The coefficient of RS appears to be significantly negative. Secondly, we regress 
inflation on LVAW. We observe that our results are similar to the previous studies 
that use different samples (Table 4, case II); the coefficient of LVAW is statistically 
significant at 1 % level of confidence. To examine if the quality of banking 
regulation and supervision (RS) has further explanatory power for inflation, we 
regress inflation on both LVAW and RS (Table 4, case III). The results show that 
including RS to our regressions is an improvement; the adjusted R-square is higher 
than in case II, as it increases from 0.22 to 0.46. In case IV of Table 4, we include 
CLI instead of RS to our regressions and we observe that it is also an improvement 
over the case 11 of Table 4. Adjusted R-square becomes 0.58. Finally, we regress 
inflation on all the three variables, RS, CLl, LVAW, together (Table 4, case V). We 
observe the highest adjusted R-square, 0.61, in this case. Although in all the 
regressions the coefficients of the variables are statistically significant, in case V we 
observe that the t-statistics for all of them decrease. The possible reason for this is 
the high correlation between CLl and RS (56%). Table 5 shows the correlations 
among RS, CLI and LVAW. In a larger sample, we expect to dissolve this issue of 
high correlation, since transition economies have adopted laws that show great 
similarities. However, these correlations do not weaken our results.
From Table 4, we conclude that the quality of banking regulation and 
supervision, central bank independence and liberalization are all negatively related to 
inflation. Given the level of central bank independence and liberalization, including 
the measure of the quality of bank regulation and supervision (RS) explains inflation 
better.
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TABLE 4. Estimation of the Transformed Inflation Rate (D) Using RS, 
CLl and LVAW
Explanatory
Variable
1 II III IV V
c 0,91*** 0,71*** 1,14*** 0,87*** 1,04***
(5.35) (4.95) (6.52) (7.91) (6.98)
Ivaw -0,77*** -0,61** -0,39* -0,39*
(-2.85) (-2.66) (-1.80) (-1.90)
rs -1,92*** -1,66*** -0,81*
(-3.57) (-3.38) (-1.65)
cli -0,10*** -0,08***
(-4.69) (-3.21)
adjusted 0.32 0.22 0.46 0.58 0.61
N o te s :  1. The t-statistics are reported in parenthesis under estimated coefficients.
2. * indicates significance at the 10 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, 
and *** at the 1 percent level
Table 5: Correlation Matrix
RS CLI LVAW
RS 1.00 0.56 0.20
CLI 1.00 0.38
LVAW 1.00
Another point that we should mention about these regressions is that we do 
not use war dummy. In the previous studies, war dummy is used. Since in a war 
situation, expenditures increase, which is a case of causing inflation. However, in our 
sample, when we regress inflation on war dummy, it becomes statistically 
insignificant. So, we do not include war dummy in our regressions.
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After we examine the relations between RS, LVAW, CLl and inflation and 
find empirical support for our hypothesis, we further investigate their relationship 
with inflation, by allowing for interactions among these indices. To do that we form 
dummies for both RS and CLl: dRS and dCLl. dRS picks up those values that are 
above its mean value (3.1), whereas dCLI picks up those values of CLl that are 
above The regressions are reported in Table 6. In case 1, we regress inflation 
over LVAW, as in Table 4, case 11. Then, we run the regression including an 
interaction term between the indices of regulation and supervision and central bank 
independence (Table 6, Case 11). We observe that, with respect to case 1, this 
specification leads to an improvement in terms of the adjusted R-square; adjusted R- 
square increases from 0.22 to 0.45. Next, we regress inflation on CBl, and CBl in 
interaction with dCLl (Table 6, case 111). Again, we observe an improvement in the 
adjusted R-square with respect to case 1 of Table 6; it increases from 0.22 to 0.50. 
When we examine the relation of inflation with central bank independence; with high 
level of liberalization, in interaction with central bank independence (LVAW*dCLI), 
and with a high level of banking regulation and supervision in interaction with 
central bank independence (LVAW*dRS), the coefficients become statistically more 
significant than case IV in Table 4. Also, adjusted R-square of it, 0.62, is greater than 
case 1, case 11, and case 111 of Table 6
 ^The break point value of 2 for dCLI is cliosen following CMN(1999). On the other hand, estimations 
with the break point value of 2.5 also performed; the results are similar.
'' Tlie variables are more specifically defined in Uie following way. 
dRS= 1 i f RS>3 . 1  
dRS = 0 otherwise
and
dCLI = 1 if  CLl > 2 
dCLI = 0 otherwise
55
We can interpret this result as follows. When there is a high degree of 
liberalization, effective regulation and supervision; as well as central bank 
independence, inflation is lower. The previous studies show the negative relation of 
inflation with central bank independence and liberalization. The results we derive 
here improves those findings, by showing that although there is a negative relation 
with these variables, effective regulation and supervision make these relationships 
even more significant. Hence, we conclude that for lower inflation, an independent 
central bank is not enough. Rather, besides central bank independence and 
liberalization, there also should be an effectively regulated and supervised banking 
system.
TABLE 6: The Transformed Inflation Rate (D) and the Interactions of 
RS, CLI and LVAW
Explanatory Variable 1 II III IV
c 0,71*** 0,64*** 0,62*** 0,59***
(4.95) (5.28) (5.28) (5.69)
Ivaw -0,77*** -0.37 -0.12 0.05
(-2.85) (-1.42) (-0.44) (0.18)
lvaw*drs -0,50*** -0,37***
(-3.35) (-2.83)
lvaw*dcli -0,64*** -0,51***
(-3.79) (-3.28)
adj-r2 0.22 0.45 0.50 0.62
N o tes : 1. t-slatistics are reported in parenthesis under estimated coefficients.
2. * indicates significance at the 10 percent level, “  at the 5 percent level, and 
*** at the 1 percent level
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
This paper develops a criieria list to evaluate banking laws in order to 
measure the quality of banking regulation and supervision. To create the criteria list, 
we utilise the Basle Core Principles, the existing theory about regulation and 
supervision and the banking laws. In the criteria list, we express the principles of 
banking regulation and supervision in 8 major headings: i. capital requirements; ii. 
lending, iii. ownership structure; iv directors and managers; v. reporting and 
recording; vi. corrective action; vii. regulatory agency and viii. supervisory agency. 
The criteria list we design here concern specifically the transition economies. We 
expect that, when we include developing and developed countries in our study, the 
criteria list will be enhanced and modified.
Using this criteria list, we next derive an index for the quality of regulation 
and supervision (RS) for transition economies. The RS index measures the quality of 
banking regulation and supervision as can be read from the banking laws, and not 
from the actual implementations. When countries have two different laws with 
different enactment years, they are both included in the data, thus providing a limited 
time series dimension for the study. Observing the index numbers, we can state that 
the transition economies generally do not have effective banking regulation and 
supervision. Moreover, the weakest area in the banking laws is the credit granting 
process. In other words, the credit risk is not controlled effectively in transition 
economies although the credit risk is the major risk a bank undertakes.
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Our empirical analysis involves estimating the effects on inflation of the level 
of liberalization, legal central bank independence and the quality of bank regulation 
and supervision. The findings support our hypothesis that inflation is negatively 
related to the quality of bank regulation and supervision (RS), besides the degree of 
liberalization (CLI), and the legal central bank independence (LVAW). The case of 
Bulgaria, however, is an exception. The first result we derive by these observations is 
that effective regulation and supervision with high levels of liberalization and legal 
central bank independence implies low levels of inflation.
Our results improve the results of Cukierman, Miller and Neyapti (1998) who 
find that legal central bank independence and the degree of liberalization negatively 
affect inflation. The parameter RS improves the negative relationship between 
inflation and legal central bank independence and liberalization. We can, then, 
conclude that effective banking regulation and supervision, along with a high level of 
legal central bank independence and liberalization, has a significant role for price 
stability.
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF CRITERIA FOR MEASURING THE QUALITY OF BANK 
REGULATJON AND SUPERVISION
A. Capital Requirements
L Minimum cnpilal at licensing
a. Minimum capital
(1) nominal amount
(2) determined by supervisor
(3) no comment
2. Capital adequacy
a. Maximum risky assets of a bank should be
(1 ) 5% of liable capital
(2) 10% of liable capital
(3) over 10 % of liable capital not mentioned
b. Is liable capital explicitly defined?
(1) yes
(2) no
c. Is there any extra capital required to cover losses?
(1 )  yes
(2) no
S.Major acquisitions and investments
a. Maximum aggregate amount of investment
(1) 20 % of its own funds
(2) 40 % of its own funds
(3) 60 % of its own funds
(4) 80 % of its own funds
(5) no restriction
b, Instead of repayment o f a loan, a juridical person's capital may be owned for
(1) more than 3 years
(2 )  2 years
(3) 1 year
(4) no comment
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c. Maximum amount of capital of any juridical person a bank may participate is
(1) 5 % of its own funds
(2) 10% of its own funds
(3) 20% of its own funds
(4) no comment
d. Maximum aggregate amount of investment on juridical persons 
(]) 20 % of liable capital
C2) 40 % of liable capital 
f3) 60 % of liable capital
(4) 80 % of liable capital
(5) no comment or higher
B. l-.cndiii2
1. Lending to Private Sector
a. May supervisors prohibit emergency loans?
(1) yes
(2) no
b. Maximum total amount of certain positions of a bank involving price risks at 
close of business any day
(1) 25 % of liable capital
(2) 50 % of liable capital
(3) more than 50 % of liable capital or not mentioned
c. Is there a defined system to evaluate the creditworthiness of borrowers?
(!) yes
(2) no
d. May a bank investigate balance sheet of the borrower to evaluate the financial 
standing?
(1 )  yes
(2) no
e. Maximum risk for one borrower
(1) 10 % of liable capital
(2) 20 % of liable capital
(3) 30 % of liable capital
(4) over 30 % or not mentioned
f  Maximum aggregate credit for one borrower
(1) 25 % of capital
(2) 50 % of capital
(3) 75 % of liable capital
(4) over 75 % or not mentioned
62
g. Maximum risk for one related party
(1) 10 % of liable capital
(2) 20 % of liable capital
(3) 30 % of liable capital
(4) over 30 % or not mentioned
h. Maximum aggregate credit for one related party
(1) 25 % of capital
(2) 50% of capital
(3) 75 % of liable capital
(4) over 75 % or not mentioned
i. Maximum aggregate credit that may be given to borrowers
(1 )  10 times capital
(2) 20 times capital
(3) 30 times capital
(4) over 30 times of capital or not mentioned
j. Maximum aggregate credit that may be given to related parties
(1 )  1 times capital
(2) 2 times capital
(3) 3 times capital
(4) over 3 times capital or not mentioned
k. Maximum aggregate credit that may be given to 10 big borrowers
(1 ) 5 times capital
(2) 10 times capital
(3) 15 times capital
(4) over 15 times of capital or not mentioned
l. Maximum aggregate credits to employers
(1) 10 % of bank capital
(2) 20 % of liable capital
(3) 30 % of liable capital
(4) over 3 % of liable capital or not mentioned
m. Maximum aggregate credit to managers
(1) 10 % of bank capital
(2) 20 % of liable capital
(3) 30 % of liable capital
(4) over 30 % of liable capital or not mentioned
n. Maximum risk that should be reported
(1) 10 % of liable capital
(2) 20 % of liable capital
(3) 30 % of liable capital
(4) over 30 % or not mentioned
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o. Rules for calculating guarantees for loans
(1) given
(2) not given
p. Do credit to shareholders allowed?
(1) no
(2) yes
2. Lending to the Government
a. May banks carry out operations with budget funds on the basis of concluded 
contracts, carry out money transfers with the organs of executive power and 
municipal organs, provide for aimful use of budget funds allocated for the purpose of 
carrying out state and regional programs?
0 )  yes
(2) no
b. Extending credit to government and local government to finance budget deficits 
allowed or not?
(1) yes
(2) no
C. Ownership slriicliire 
LRestrictions on shareholders
a. Financial standing for shareholders wanted for
(1) over 5 years
(2) greater or equal to 3 years less than 5 years
(3) greater or equal to 1 year less than 3 years
(4) no comment
b. Financial standing of shareholders asked owning
(1) over 1% of total shares
(2) over 5% of total shares
(3) over 10% of total shares
(4) no comment
c. Maximum share one may own
(1) 10 % of total shares
(2) 25 % of total shares
(3) 50 % of total shares
(4) 75 % of total shares
(5) more than 75 % of total shares or not mentioned
d. Source of the capital
(1) should be proved
(2) no comment
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e. Who are restricted from being shareholders?
(1) political parties and social funds and media
(2) either 1 or 2 of (1)
(3) not restricted
f  Does the law prohibit selection of shareholders that are associated bank failures 
as a director or manager or a shareholder in the past?
(1 ) yes
(2) no
2. Transfer of shareholders
a. When how much shares transferred supervisor should be notified?
0 )  less than 5 %
(2) greater or equal to 5 % less than 10 %
(3) greater or equal to 10 % less than 25 %
(4) greater or equal to 25 % less than 50 %
(5) over 50 % or No comment
b. When a shareholder die may supervisor prohibit business?
(1) yes
(2) no
c. While increasing or decreasing shares when how much capital reached it should 
be reported?
(1) less than 10 %
(2) greater or equal to 10 % less than 25 %
(3) greater or equal to 25 % less than 50 %
(4) greater or equal to 50 % less than 75 %
(5) no comment
D. Directors and Mana2crs
a. Is there a rule of dual controF^?
(1) Yes
(2) No
b. How much experience needed for top managers?
(1) More than 5 years
(2) greater or equal to 3 years less than 5 years
(3) greater or equal to 1 year less than 3 years
(4) no clause
c. History of top managers asked for
(1) more than 10 years
(2) greater or equal to 5 years less than 10 years
(3) greater or equal to 1 year less than 5 years
(4) no clause
‘ Decisions should be taken by at least two managers.
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d. How much experience needed for other managers?
(1) more than 5 years
(2) greater or equal to 3 years less than 5 years
(3) greater or equal to 1 year less than 3 years
(4) no clause
e. History of other managers asked for
(1) more than 10 years
(2) greater or equal to 5 years less than 10 years
(3) greater or equal to 1 year less than 5 years
(4) no clause
f Does the law prohibit selection of directors or managers who are associated bank 
failures as a director or manager in the past?
(]) yes 
(2) no
E. Reporting / Rccordiii2
1. Operating Plan Systems of Control and Internal Organisation
a. Are qualifications about independent auditors asked in law?
(!) yes
(2) no
b. Is information about systems of control and internal organisations spelled out in 
law?
(1) yes
(2) no
c. Does information about qualifications of managers of the board required in the 
law?
(1) yes
(2) no
d. Are the duties of the managers of the board defined explicitly?
(1) yes
(2) no
2. Financial Projection
a. Projected balance sheet for
(1) over 3 years
(2) 2 years
(3) 1 year
(4) no comment
66
3. Cross Border Banking
a. Is approval from home country required when the proposed owner a foreign 
bank?
(1) yes
(2) no
4. On-site siipendsion
a. Do on-site checks exist?
(1) yes
(2) no
b. Who does on-site checks?
(1) supervisor's employees
(2) auditors
(3) other or not mentioned
c. Frequency of audits
(1) monthly or more often
(2) quarterly
(3) yearly
(4) not mentioned
d. Is there a detailed scope for auditing report"^
(1)  yes
(2) no
e. Do auditors inform supervisors about irregularities and deficiencies?
(1) yes
(2) no
f  Does background of auditors indicated?
(1) yes
(2) no
g. Do the auditing reports obey the accounting standards set by the reports?
(1) yes
(2) no
5. Coverage of Reporting and Recording
a. Is there a requirement for reporting annual balance sheets?
(1) yes
(2) no
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b. Frequency of bank reports
(1) monthly
(2) quarterly
(3) semiannually
(4) annually
(5) not mentioned
c. Is there any repon on liquidity creditworthiness and profitability of the bank?
(1) yes
(2) no
d. Does the bank notify the supervisor when there is a change in the charter?
( 1 )  yes
(2) no
e. Is there a detailed scope for supervision reports?
(])yes
(2) no
F. Corrective Action
a. Are the cases causing conservatorship defined clearly?
(1) yes
(2) no
b. Are the cases causing liquidation trustee defined clearly?
(1) yes
(2) no
c. Central Bank provides credit
(1) under very restrictive conditions
(2) under looser conditions
(3) no restrictions
d. Limit of loss causing licence back
(1) less than 1/3 of liable capital
(2) greater or equal to 1/3 of liable capital less than 2/3 of liable capital
(3) greater or equal to 2/3 of liable capital
G. Rc£ulation
a. Who does the regulation?
(1) council o f bank, central bank and an independent authority
(2) independent authority
(3) independent authority and central bank
(4) central bank
(5) government and central bank
(6) government
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a. Who does the supervision?
(1) council of bank, central bank and an independent authority
(2) independent authority
(3) independent authority and central bank
(4) central bank
(5) government and central bank
(6) government
H. Siipen'ision
69
APPENDIX B. Disaggregated Variables of the Quality of Banking Regulation and Supervision 
(See Appendix A for the description of the variables)
COUNTRIES A1A A2A A2B A2C ASA A3B A3D B1A BIB B1C BID B1E
ALBENIA 96 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
ARMENIA 93 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
ARMENIA 96 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
AZERBAIJAN 92 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
AZERBAIJAN 96 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.8 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0
BELARUS 92 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
BULGARIA 92 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0
CROATIA 93 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CROATIA 96 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0
CZECH 92 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CZECH 94 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
GEORGIA 96 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
HUNGARY 94 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0
KAZAKHISTAN 9 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
KAZAKHISTAN 9 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
KRGYZSTAN 91 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
LITHUANIA 92 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
MACEDONIA 94 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
MOLDOVA 91 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
MONGOLIA 91 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
POLAND 89 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
SLOVAK 92 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
TAJIKISTAN94 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
UZBEKISTAN91 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
O
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C O U N TR IE S B1F B IG B1H B1I B1J B1K B1L B1M B IN B IO B1P B2A B2B
A LB E N IA  96 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5
A R M E N IA  93 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
A R M E N IA  96 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
A ZER B A IJA N  92 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5
A ZER B A IJA N  96 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5
B E LA R U S  92 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
B U LG A R IA  92 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0
C R O A TIA  93 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5
C R O A TIA  96 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5
C ZE C H  92 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C ZEC H  94 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
G E O R G IA  96 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5
H U N G A R Y  94 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
KAZA K H ISTA N  93 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
KAZA K H ISTA N  95 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
K R G YZSTA N  91 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
L ITH U A N IA  92 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0
M A C ED O N IA  94 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
M O LD O V A  91 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
M O N G O LIA  91 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
P O LA N D  89 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
S L O V A K  92 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
T A JIK IS TA N  94 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
U ZB E K IS TA N  91 0 .0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
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COUNTRIES El A E1B E1C E1D E2A E3A E4A E4B E4C E4D E4E E4F E4G
ALBENIA 96 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.3 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
ARMENIA 93 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
ARMENIA 96 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.7 1.0 0.3 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0
AZERBAIJAN 92 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
AZERBAIJAN 96 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
BELARUS 92 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
BULGARIA 92 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0
CROATIA 93 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.7 1.0 0.3 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CROATIA 96 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.7 1.0 0.3 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CZECH 92 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CZECH 94 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
GEORGIA 96 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
HUNGARY 94 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.3 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
KAZAKHISTAN 93 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0
KAZAKHISTAN 95 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0
KRGYZSTAN 91 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0
LITHUANIA 92 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
MACEDONIA 94 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
MOLDOVA 91 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
MONGOLIA 91 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0
POLAND 89 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
SLOVAK 92 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
TAJIKISTAN 94 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
UZBEKISTAN 91 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0
U)
(T ab le  continues on the follow ing p ag e .)
Appendix B. (Cant'd),
COUNTRIES ESA E5B ESC ESD ESE F1A FIB F1C FID G1A H1AALBENIA 96 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.5ARMENIA 93 1.0 0.4 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.8 0.5ARMENIA 96 1.0 0.6 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.5AZERBAIJAN 92 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.5AZERBAIJAN 96 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.8 0.5BELARUS 92 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.8 0.5BULGARIA 92 1.0 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.8 0.5CROATIA 93 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.5CROATIA 96 1.0 0.6 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.5CZECH 92 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5CZECH 94 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5GEORGIA 96 1.0 0.2 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.5HUNGARY 94 1.0 0.6 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.0KAZAKHISTAN 9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.5KAZAKHISTAN 9 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.5KRGYZSTAN 91 1.0 0.2 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.5LITHUANIA 92 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.5MACEDONIA 94 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.5MOLDOVA 91 1.0 0.6 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.5MONGOLIA 91 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.5POLAND 89 1.0 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.5SLOVAK 92 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5TAJIKISTAN 94
1 I W "  t  0 ^  t  0 ^  m m . ·  m
0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.5UZBEKISTAN 91 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.5
N o tes : 1 . Accompanying the country names are the years in which the banking laws are enacted. As can be seen in the table, five of the
nineteen countries in the sample have enacted two banking laws.
2. The variables A1 to H1 are enumarated based on the seventy-two criteria which are reported in Appendix A.
3. All vanables are normalised between 0 and 1, such that when a variable takes the value of 1, it indicates the largest degree of quality 
of bank regulation and supervision, with respect to the particular aspect of the banking law that variable intends to measure.
4. All data are obtained from the banking laws.
